Security

Zeron trades your account. It cannot take money out of it.

Your money never leaves the exchanges. It is never sent to Zeron, never pooled, never held in a wallet we control, and never passed through one. What you connect is a trading key, one per perp, and on every perp below that key can do one thing: place orders on your own account. It cannot send your money to anybody.

This page says how that is true on each exchange, and links to each exchange’s own documentation so you do not have to take our word for any of it.

The rule

A perp that cannot separate trading from withdrawing does not get an adapter

Every exchange here keeps trading and moving money apart: one key trades, and your own wallet is the only thing that can move the money. That is not a happy coincidence, it is the condition for being on the list. An exchange that cannot keep the two apart is not integrated, however good the rest of it is.

One exchange was assessed and turned down for exactly that: its trading key could also move money, with no way to limit it to trading. It never went live here, and it is the reason the rule is written down rather than assumed.

The 11 perps, one by one

What Zeron holds, and what that key can do

One line per exchange, saying what its key can do and where your money can go, with that exchange’s own documentation beside it. Open any of them and read it there: none of this rests on our word for it.

The software itself

There is no withdrawal in this app to call by accident

The engine speaks a fixed vocabulary to every exchange, and it is short: read the order book, read your balance, read your position, read your fills, rest a limit order, cross the spread, cancel, arm a stop, check the stop is still there, raise leverage. That is the whole list. There is no transfer and no withdrawal anywhere in it, so there is no code path that could be tricked into one.

Where an exchange exposes a general REST surface rather than a handful of operations, the server keeps an allow-list of the exact endpoints this app calls and refuses everything else — an allow-list rather than a blocked-words list, because a path can be spelled several ways and two URL parsers can disagree about which one it is.

Your key is sealed before it is written down, with AES-256-GCM under a key derived by scrypt from a server secret that is not in the database. A stolen copy of the database is not a set of live keys. The browser never gets the secret back either: once stored, reading your own keys returns a mask that says a key exists and nothing more.

What we never ask for

No seed phrase, no wallet key, no exchange password

Zeron asks your wallet to sign three things and no others: a message proving the wallet is yours when you sign in, the approval of a trading key at an exchange — the same approval that exchange’s own app would ask for — and, if you subscribe, the subscription payment, which is an ordinary USDC transfer of the plan’s exact price that you start by pressing the button. The first two move nothing; the third moves what the button says and nothing else. Anything asking you for a seed phrase, a wallet private key or an exchange password is not us.

Revoking is one click here and one at the venue, and the second is the one that counts: deleting a perp in Zeron erases the key from our database, and revoking it on the exchange makes it stop working everywhere, including for us. Do both, in that order or the other.

Whatever happens

Money can only go back to your own wallet

There is no arrangement on this list where your money can be sent to a stranger. On every exchange here, money leaving the account can only go back to the wallet that owns it, which is yours. That is the floor, and it holds even in the worst case anybody can construct.

What is left is the trading itself, and it is trading: Zeron opens real positions with real money on exchanges nobody here controls, both legs hedged and both stopped. The terms of use set that out in full, and the legal notice says who operates the service.